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How to allocate the powers to collect information, surveil and restrict investment
between the EU and the Member States? The question which competence the EU
can base a legislative measure on is not only of importance for the legal validity
of the measure, it also has far reaching ramifications for the underlying political
relationship between the EU and its Member States.
Competence allocation according to the draft
regulation
The Commission explicitly bases the regulation on art. 207 (2) TFEU as part of the
common commercial policy falling within the exclusive competence of the EU. From
this it follows that Member States are prohibited to enact national legislation as long
as they are not authorized by the EU to do so (art. 2 (1) TFEU). Thus, it would fit
to see the regulation as an authorization of the MS to keep their national screening
mechanisms in place. The language of the explanatory memorandum partly reflects
this, when it describes the regulation as “an enabling framework for Member States”
to provide legal certainty.
Unfortunately, things are not that clear. The explanatory memorandum also states
the regulation merely “confirms” that FDI may be screened by the Member States.
However, if FDI screening falls within the exclusive competence of the EU, which
Member State competence is there to be “confirmed”? Rather, Member States would
have to be explicitly empowered (or “enabled”).
Restriction of the freedom of capital movement?
Another possible legal basis for the proposed regulation could be seen in art. 64
(3) TFEU. The provision allows the Council, acting in accordance with a special
legislative procedure, to “adopt measures which constitute a step backwards in
Union law as regards the liberalisation of the movement of capital to or from third
countries.” Screening mechanisms can constitute such measures since they usually
create certain administrative obstacles for the foreign investor to move capital into
the European Union. At the same time, Member States could base their existing
screening mechanisms on the exemption clause of art. 65 (1) b TFEU which grants
Member States the right “to lay down procedures for the declaration of capital
movements for purposes of administrative or statistical information, or to take
measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security.” The
EU regulation and the national legislations would then go hand in hand – without a
need for an authorization of the Member States by the EU. This result would have
two important consequences: Firstly, the matter would not fall within the exclusive
competence of the EU which means that current national screening mechanisms
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would not be in violation of EU law. Secondly, the legislative procedure is different.
Whereas art. 207 (2) TFEU refers to the ordinary legislative procedure, art. 64 (3)
TFEU prescribes a unanimous decision by the Council. Member State control over
the new FDI screening framework would be significantly higher.
Art. 207 (2) TFEU or art. 64 (3) TFEU as lex
specialis?
The majority of commentators sees art. 207 (2) TFEU as the correct legal basis
for investment restricting legislative measures.
1
 This position is partly based on
the requirement of “uniform principles“ in paragraph 1 of art. 207 TFEU which –
according to this position – can only be achieved through exclusive competence
of the EU. Yet, instead of finding a general preference of one legal basis over
the other, it might be more convincing to look at each legislative measure on
a case by case basis. A strong argument for art. 207 (2) TFEU with a view to
the proposed regulation is that the regulation itself hardly constitutes “a step
backwards in Union law as regards the liberalisation of the movement of capital
to or from third countries” (art. 64 (3) TFEU) but rather a “framework” (art. 207
(2) TFEU) that provides for the coordination between different national screening
mechanisms. An interesting scenario that needs to be further addressed would be
an EU regulation which creates additional barriers such as a reciprocity requirement
in the liberalisation of FDI. In this situation the language of art. 64 (3) TFEU might
provide a strong lex specialis argument and also the special legislative procedure
could suite the highly political nature of such a regulation more. With regards to the
current proposal, however, art. 207 (2) TFEU appears to be the correct legal basis.
“Almost” exclusive competence
With this in mind, the question arises whether current Member States screening
mechanisms are now – in the absence of an authorization – in violation of EU law.
The basic answer to this question might not be surprising: More than one provision
as well as the unwritten exemptions based on the case law of the CJEU grant
Member States the right to take measures for the protection of national security or
public order. Whether this can be achieved by relying on art. 65 (1) b TFEU “via”
art. 207 (6) TFEU or art. 346 (1) b TFEU or unwritten exemptions is a question that
has to be further addressed in detail. What could already be concluded now is that
current Member States screening mechanisms do not – against the view of some
commentators – constitute a violation of EU law. Rather, the draft regulation should
be understood as ensuring that Member States screening mechanisms are based
only on grounds of national security and not on other policy objectives (art. 3 (1) of
the regulation). It is at this point the regulation proves that it aims at a liberal FDI
framework: The text of the regulation obliges Member States not to take any FDI
restricting measures which are not based on national security while at the same time
the regulation itself does not go beyond security concerns – even if it could do so
based on art. 207 (2) TFEU or art. 64 (3) TFEU.
- 2 -
1Boysen/Oeter, in: Schulze/Zuleeg/Kadelbach (eds.), Europarecht, 3. Aufl. 2014,
§ 32 Rn. 34 f.; Beuttenmüller, Das deutsche Außenwirtschaftsgesetz vor dem
Hintergrund der neuen Unionskompetenz für ausländische Direktinvestitionen,
28 Ritsumeikan Law Review 2011, S. 281 (286); Herrmann, Die Zukunft der
mitgliedstaatlichen Investitionspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, EuZW 2010,
S. 207 (208 f.); Nowak, Europarecht nach Lissabon, 2011, S. 264
- 3 -
